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Economic development is not a one-dimensional process
whereby a country's productivity and Gross National Product
increase, machines are substituted for men, and new products
appear. Deve~opment is characterized by the creation of a
new society.
For economic development to come about, changes must
occur in traditional man's perception of his social and
physical environment and his relationship to it •. This is
essential if traditional man and his society are to break
out of the stability and fatalism of poverty, escape from
superstition and ignorance, and overcome the inertia of
social custom and vested interest.
The purpose of this article is to examine how ideologi-
cal mobilization in Mao Tse-tung's China has functioned to
undermine traditional impediments to economic development
and instil the idea that progress is both possible and
desirable.
The politics and economic programs of Mao Tse-tung have long been associated
with ideological mobilization. The clearest example of ideological mobilization
was the Great Leap Forward (1958-1959) when the people were called upon by politi-
cal activists to under-bake a vast range of econoridc, po"litical, military, social,
and cultural. programs. The driving impetus of this activity was the ideological
exhortation of the Party cadres.
One of the most interesting analyses of ideological mobilization in China has
been offered by Robert Jay Lifton (1968:99-126), a psychologist. Lifton uses the
term "psychism" to describe China's "attempt to achieve control over one's external
environment through internal or psychological menf.pu.Latifons" (1968: 32) • According
to Lifton, psychism.was dominant during the Great Leap Forward, for this was a period
when China proclaimed that it would soon overtake some of the capitalist countries
in industrial and agricultural production while discovering a short-cut to the
communist utopia. Talk of an "uninterrupted" or "permanent" revolution suggested the
"total mobilization of faith" and the reliance on ideology. Lifton writes that the
Great Leap was characterized by the assumption that "one could ignore the intellectual
and mechanical requirements of technology and depend instead upon human will"1(1968:
104). Lifton quotes from the Chinese press to illustrate his point.
Many living examples show that there is only unproductive thought, there
are no unproductive regions. There are only poor methods for cultivating
th~ land, there is no such thing as poor land. Provided only that people
manifest in full measure their subjective capacities for action, it is
b
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possible to modify natural conditions.
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'I'he entire tone of the Great Leap suggests a V1Sl.On of "immortal Chinese revolutionary
a.nd cultural substance" overcoming the technical requirements of industrialism
(Lifton, 1968:105). However, ideological mobilization during the Great Leap -
"politics takes command" and "reliance on the mass line" - led to considerable
disruption of the administrative and economic system.
Technicians and engineers were humiliated by the existence of a situa-
tion under which experts had to listen to non-experts in technical matters,
scientific laws were replaced by political demands, and production fell
into the hands of a group of "fanatics" (Lifton, 1968:105, quoted from
Chao, 1964).
Here we see, according to Lifton, the consequences of the Maoist assumption that
"revolutionary enthusiasm and ideological purity could make up for the lack of
technical competence and material means"(Schram, 1966:294).
The tone of Lifton's analysis of psychism is critical. He, like most other
students of contemporary Chinese affairs, views ideological mobilization as an
aberration which.can only be counter-productive to the goals of economic and politi-
cal development. It is ironic, however, that at a time when the Maoist emphasis on
ideological mobilization is being criticized, some economists are beginning to
recognize the importance of subjective attitudes in the developmental process.
Economic development is not a one-dimensional process whereby a country's
productivity and GNP increase, machines are substituted for men, and new products
appear. Development is characterized by the creation of a new society. Joseph J.
Spengler, an economist, assigned a central role to ideas and beliefs when he suggested
that the state of a people's politico-economic development, together with its rate
and direction, depends largely upon what is in the minds of its members, particularly
the elites, and reflects in part their conceptions of the universe (Spengler, 1961:4;
for similar conceptions of the problem see Northrop, Jaspers, Monlin). To reformulate
Spengler's hypothesis, it is submitted here that economic development can come about
only as a result of changes in man's perception of his social and physical environment
and his relationship to it. This must occur if traditional man and his society are
to break out of the stability and 'fatalism of poverty, escape from superstition and
ignorance, and overcome the inertia of social custom and vested interest. If tradi-
tional man does not begin to prize change and presuppose its possibility, to
accumulate and apply development oriented scientific knowledge, to possess habits,
beliefs and values which are compatible with industrial society, then little or no
.development will occur.
While in the abstract many Western observers of China have long recognized the
need to create a new society in China, they seem unable to acknowledge the efficacy
of Mao Tse-tung's concrete steps to put that goal into practice. For example, the
noted historian John King Fairbank writes that China was traditionally a world in
itself, not a nation among nations.
The problem of China has been therefore how to reorganize an entire
society, its institutions and customs, ideas and ideals. The Chinese
people have been challenged to think differently and act differently,
speak a new national language and read a new written language, and
really remake themselves completely (1962:13).
While recognizing this need, he can do no more than admit that "communism has seemed
to prove a way of meeting this challenge, but ~ ~ arbitrarily selective basis
(Fairbank, 1962:13). What is arbitrary in this context lies in the eyes of the beholder.
We must come to terms with the developmental context of Mao Tse-tung's thought with-
out imposing our own ideological and cultural values on the question. If we fail to
do this, we will continue to perceive China's ideological mobilization as an aberration.
The purpose of this article is to examine the role of ideological mobilization in
overcoming certain obstacles to economic development. Specifically, it will be
argued that ideological mobilization can help weaken the influence of Chinese culture
and tradition as these retard development and provide the "will" or "incentive" for
change in Chinese society.
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Chinese Tradition
Traditional society is extremely stable. China was a land-oriented civilization
which was almost entirely preoccuppied with an agrarian mode of life, which found its
values in stability, conservatism, and continuity. Chinese society grew over
thousands of years on the basis of agricultural self-sufficiency rather than trade
or industry. Chinese society was continental and landlocked on three sides; this
cut China off from ready access to Europe or the Middle East. While bordered on one
side by the sea, China turned inwards instead of becoming a seafaring nation. From
ancient times, the Chinese people have been immobile and tied to intensive cultivation
on small plots of land. Physical remoteness coupled with a strong sense of superiority
and perfection neutralized most impulses for change and innovation. "Why should indi-
viduals who were perfectly content with their existence," asked Bertrand Russell (1922),
"strive for economic development?" Even at the end of the nineteenth century when
the Chinese were suffering "defeat after defeat at the hands of the West" they still
maintained "almost untouched the myth of their own superiority and the assurance of
their own adequacy (Rowe, 1959:27). And why not, no other society of comparable
size, duration or influence had ever existed. It is not surprising to find the Chinese
regarding themselves as the only custodians of civilization and their country the hub
of the world. Prior to the nineteenth century there was no historical experience
that would have lead them to modify the view that they were the "centre of the world
(Elegant, 1963). Unfortunately, Chinese ethnocentrism deadened any interest or curi-
osity about other civilizations. Thus, when the question of foreign travel was raised
in the nineteenth centpry, many learned Chinese replied that one who knows the Chinese
classics has nothing left to· learn (Creel, 1953:9).
Confucianism. Confucianism provided both the institutional and philosophic
stability upon which Chinese society rested. For centuries China was the world's most
stable system of bureaucratic power. The governing bureaucracy created a vast machine
of scholars which perpetuated itself through an examination system. While this class
of scholars insured the stability of traditional Chinese society, they also contributed
greatly to the inertia and non-adaptability of Chinese civilization. The literati,
a class of literary skeptics who were humanistic, secular and rational, lacked the
qualities of energy and curiosity which have characterized the intellectual and civil
servant classes of modern Western nations.
The literati entered public service by passing a civil service examination
stressing memorization of the classics and austerity in literary style. However,
passing the "seven-legged" examination and memorizing the Confucian classics hardly
prepared the Chinese intelligentsia for the technical innovations required by indus-
trialism or the efficient use of violence required of the modern nation-state. On
the contrary, the intellectual energies of the intelligentsia were directed toward
reading, contemplation, reflection, and memorization. Thus, Confucianism became a
closed system of ideas which defined the mental boundaries within which an individual's
curiosity and imagination could operate. The Confucian orthodoxy filtered, selected,
refined, and interpreted the stimuli of the external world. The effect of this
situation may be suggested by considering the effect upon potential Western entre-
preneurs and civil servants if they had conceived, analyzed, and implemented policy
in terms of classical Christian dogma. How far would economic development have
progressed if potential entrepreneurs had spent hours memorizing the Bible, developing
a literary style for expressing Biblical quotations, and even more time contemplating
the teachings of Christ? Such a person might have been a morally superior individual,
but he would not have become the dynamic force behind the economic transformations
of our age.











The conservatism of Chinese society also had its roots in the class interests
of the literati, who placed the preservation of their class interests above Chinese
sovereignty and above the requirements of modernization. The class interests of the
literati were founded on a maintenance of the status quo. Extensive contact with
Western technology and ideas could only undermine this status quo. Chinese
Communism has, of course, expressed a deep and occasionally violent antagonism towards
the traditional elite of China. In rejecting the traditional Chinese social system,
the thought of Mao Tse-tung also rejects Western capitalism. Thus, the Marxist
components of Mao's thought explain the downfall of traditonal Chinese society as
the victim of capitalist imperialism. In so doing, the thought of Mao can exploit
the widespread sense of humiliation felt in China (Pye, 1968:chap.5) by attacking
the social classes, institutions, and social philosophies which made that humiliation
possible. 3
Man's relationship to the universe. In China, as in other traditional societies,
the individual's capacity to understand or control the forces which shape his life
are highly restrained or even non-existent. Life is perceived as a mystery in a
profound sense in which it is not to the modern man. Since the traditional individual
merely takes for granted that the phenomena of the world around him are arbitrary and
unamenable to analysis, his salvation lies in persuading the spiritual authorities
to intervene on his behalf (Yang, 1967). F.M. Watkins has written that pre-industrial
man:
lives in a stable and tradition dominated world, a closed society, where
external forces seem to determine the conditions of human: existence. To
perceive and conform to the requirements of these extra-human forces is
the primary problem (1951:570).
Perhaps the best expressions of how the Chinese traditionally sought to conform to
the requirements of extra-human forces can be found in Chinese art and literature
(Soper, 1956; Hightower, 1950). Throughout Chinese culture, particularly in Chinese
poetry and painting, we find an awareness of the beauty and mystery of Nature (Bodde,
1965:32). Man is always present in the cosmic view of the Chinese but never in an
assertive or dominant place. Never are the mountains, rivers, and forests of the
great Chinese landscape painters mere decorative backdrops for man and his activities,
as so often is the case in Western art. But Chinese landscapes are never empty and
seemingly uninhabited wildernesses; invariably they possess tiny yet distinct human
figures, a fisherman in his boat, a woodcutter, or a recluse sitting in contemplation
on a rock. Man's relationship to the cosmic order in traditional China stands in
stark contrast to conquest and pollution of the natural environment in an industrial
society (Cf. Babbitt, 1919:270-4). While Western still-life painters portray the
string of slaughtered game, the platter of plucked fruit, and the bowl of cut flowers,
animals, birds, insects, and plants, in Chinese paintings are always shown alive and
in their natural surr~undings.
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Fatalism. While Western man has exalted the human personality by demonstrating
man's command over nature, Chinese attitudes were characterized by a high degree of
fatalism. This fatalism inhibited the rise and diffusion of new ideas and methods.
It is not surprising that new ideas and new methods which threatened to undermine
the authority of the traditional elite and the beliefs and stable institutional
relationships of all Chinese were viewed with panic, confusion, and resistence. An
M.I.T. report on modernization captured, in more general terms, the source of such
resistance.
The cultural and religious life of traditional societies and the
values they elevated, varied widely. Generally, however, they formed
a coherent-pattern, giving men a reasonable orderly rationale for
the relatively stable rounq of life they faced, at whatever level
in the society they found themselves. They provided a set of rela-
tionships of men to one another and to the world about them which
gave them a degree of security in facing their appointed destiny
within the traditional structure (1960:15).
The Chinese have traditionally had a "somewhat mystical faith in the powers of
history to bring about change" (Pye, 1968:127) within an enduring philosophical and
institutional framework. Consequently, China was a land of rebellion not revolution.
Historical change was cyclical not linear. Time inevitably would bring about the
rise and fall of all things, including families, nations, and empires. The cyclical
pattern of history and man's fate remained largely beyond the scope of human will.
This may have reflected what an anthropologist has called the "image of limited
good" in peasant societies.
Broad areas of peasant behavior are patterned in such fashion as to
suggest that peasants view their social, economic, and natural
universes - their total environment - as one in which all of the desired
things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love,
manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security
and safety, exist in finite quantity and ~ always in short supply,
as far as the peasant is concerned. Not only do these and all other
"good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition
there is B£ way directly within peasant power to increase the avail-
able guantities (Foster, 1965:296).
This "image of limited good" generated the fatalism and perhaps much of the inertia
which has characterized Chinese civilization. The distribution of the good things
in this life was a product of immutable patterns of history and not subject to
linear change.
In sharp contrast to an inner dependence on maintaining traditional values and
a pervasive assumption of scarcity, the thought of Mao Tse-tung glorifies change and
social transformation. The thought of Mao Tse-tung, for example, has done much to
transform the Chinese attitude towards nature. As expressed in a song popular in
1958:
There's no Jade Emperor in heaven,
No Dragon King on earth.
I am the Jade Emperor,
I am the Dragon King.
I order the three mountains and five peaks:
"Make way! Here I come!" (Strong, 1964).
This suggests a fundamental change in how the Chinese perceive the world and man's
relationship in it. While the Chinese used to bring their lives into harmony with
thl' nature forces of this universe, China under the influence of Mao is now attempting
to control, manipulate and dominate the forces of nature. In the same sense, the
t hough t of Mao Tse-tung attacks poverty, superstition, and ignorance. Great num-
bers of Chinese are coming to despise their situation and are beginning to believe
that change is both possible and desirable.






In the West, it was the positive statements of liberalism on the rights of man
and the progress of humanity which challenged the old regime. When the problem of
man's relation to the world and to worldly activity was seen in the light of
Puritanism, the foundation for the economic transformation of Western society had
been laid. Puritanism opened the door to modern society by giving religious
sanction to material pursuits in this world. In China" the primary way in which this
has been achieved has been through ideological mobilization. As Alexander Eckstein
has observed:
Mass indoctrination and mobilization are required to break the inertia
of the masses, the inertia built into the very fabric of society and
the structure of the economy, and to break the dead weight of tradi-
tion (1970:486).
The thought of Mao Tse-tung has functioned to transform the perceptions of the
Chinese and to infuse them with a spirit of radicalism, zeal, and commitment suffi-
cient to break the barriers of inertia, stagnation, and tradition, which have long
been recognized as the major impediments to China's modernization and development.
The thought of Mao Tse-tung, as a variant of communist thought, does not come as a
successor to capitalism in the twentieth century, but as a substitute for it (Daniels,
1962:252).
The Idea of Progress
Breaking the hold of tradition requires something stronger than economic utility,
for the promise of an increase in economic production or a better allocation of
increasing resources is rarely strong enough to counteract 'the pull of tradition when
the two values stand in conflict. What is needed is a burning faith in a vision of
a new society (Gerschenkron, 1962:24). The idea of progress has symbolized this
faith and the requisite perceptual changes essential for breaking the stability and
fatalism of traditional society. Unfortunately, nothing is more foreign to the
Confucian spirit than the idea of progress (Balazs, 1964:32).
In West·ern thought the idea of progress derived from the convergence of two
great ideas which seem d Lve r gen t and even antagonistic (Tuveson, 1964). It was the
convergence between science and the revival of the belief in a literal millennial
end to history which produced the idea of progress which in turn created in Western
society a "profound revolution in social attitudes and beliefs" (Tuveson, 1964).
Without faith in the secular mi11ennia1ism that we know as progress, Western society
might never have .ar Ls en to its current level. When mil1ennialism was combined with
science, Western man came"to believe that advances in technology and other material
aspects of culture also brought spiritual improvement. As man controls nature, he
becomes "better and better" (Tuveson, 1964:vi).
The idea of progress became a "faith" signifying confidence in a new kind of
Providence. Technological and economic endeavors would lead inevitably to a happy
ending in which the tensions and evils of the human race would be resolved. This
"faith" was not a matter of empirical v er i f Lca t Lori , rather it was a self-evident
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truth. This "faith" marked a significant change from the Renaissance ideas of
progress, for it made advancement of the human race not only possible but inevita~le
since it was prophesied in God's word. "God's method is progressive," as one of the
eighteenth century mil1ennialists argued on the basis of many scriptural texts
(Tuveson, 1964).
While the basic pattern of the millenialists has become submerged and perhaps
lost in the twentieth century, and as the idea of progress has been transported to
non-Christian areas, progress as an idea still continues as a spiritual value albeit
independent of supernatural Providence. As the world has become secular, so too has
the idea of progress. Communism has become on of the primary agents of the idea
of progress in the twentieth century.4 While the utopian element of Mao Tse-tung's
political thought is widely recognized, most specialists see Mao's vision not as an
agent but as an impediment to industrialism and economic development. We tend to be
somewhat aghast at the Maoist blend of technical innovation (science for industrialism)
and a utopian vision because we have forgotten the millennial roots of our own vision
of progress, having reduced the concept to the mindless expansion of technological
gadgetry and quantitative size. We commonly dismiss Mao as an anachronism, an old
revolutionary trying to recapture the simple social life of Yenan (See Gayn, 1967:
92-108; Schram, 1969:1-26; Lewis, 1968:449-500), or as an egotist attempting to impose
a utopian and impractical vision on Chinese society so that he might achieve "symbolic
immortality" (Lifton, 1968). Having lost our own millennial visions, perhaps we
resent the proclamation of such visions by a Chinese Communist leader.
The thought of Mao Tse-tung has carried the idea of progress to literally mil-
lions of Chinese, stimulating their imangination and challenging the stability and
inertia of their daily lives. The Maoist vision o.f progress is not a matter of
caution or qualified calculation; it is absolute, infinite, and utopian in character.
It thus counteracts petty indulgence, fear of the future, placid tolerance of
existing distress, and unwillingness to take calculated risks. (On the psychological
functions of the idea of progress, see Dahl and Lindblom, 1963:88.) Indeed, faith
in the future produces unbounded optimism; faith will bring about a total transfor-
mation of society and usher in an era of human perfection.
While it is relatively easy for the detached China specialist to identify the
counter-productive manifestations of this faith, we might recall that the Western
vision of progress has also contributed to occasional excesses. Does not the United
States owe its extensive railway system to the investment blunders of overly opti-
mistic entrepreneurs? A study of entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan suggest the early
Japanese entrepreneurs ignored many of the practical difficulties of modernization
because of their unbounded optimism. They
gave little weight to the sacrifice they imposed both on the public
and on themselves. They had instead some absolute goal, some nondis-
counted future value in mind. With their newly acquired faith in the
modern era and all that went with it, they could not be shaken by
inte~ediate losses; they knew that in the end they would succeed
(Hirschmeier, 1964:199).
Thus, progress becomes a moral imperative, far removed from the utilitarian calcula-
tions of individual or even mass economic advantage. In tracing the impact of the
idea of progress on both England and Soviet Russia, Professor Adam Ulam captures
something of the spirit of this moral imperative:
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If Marxism inherited much of the industrial mania of the early liberal
spirit, then this spirit itself ~ not without ~ certain one-sideness
and intolerance for different standards of value. The source of this
intolerance, again a paradox and an analogy to Communism, was not so
much class selfishness but precisely the sense of social mission, of
performing the necessary and inevitable task of industrialization and
modernization, of rescuing England and then the whole world from
superstition and backwardness (Ulam, 1964:97).
While it is obvious that the idea of progress occasionally becomes counter-productive,
it is the goad to action, the driving impetuous behind modernization.
In contrast to-the lethargy and inertia of traditional society, the idea of
progress imbues a people with a sense of energy and a will for action. Economic
development is sometimes correlated with a "people rushing forth with sudden energy
aware of both a new greatness and a new challenge" (Hirschmeier, 1964:207).5 Anyone
who has read the history of modern China will immediately recognize that this contrast
is precisely what distinguishes contemporary China under communism from China of the
Manchu's, warlords, and the Kuomintang. The late French Sinologist Balazs noted the
sudden energy of Chinese Communism.
Bringing politics into the daily life of the whole population has
radically altered their former habits. Innumerable demonstrations,
reunions, marches, committees, meetings, and public trials; theatrical
performances, dances, public rejoicings; notices, pamphlets, journals -
by ev~ry possible means official slogans are constantly drilled into
every brain. In this way, what was fo~erly ~ sluggish, lethargic,
undifferentiated~ of people has been shaken ~, wakened ~,
enlivened, turned ·topsy-turvy, thus releasing ~ elemental force that
will have incalculable consequences (1964:169, emphasis added).
What is this elemental force which is turning Chinese society topsy-turvy?
Benjamin Schwartz's study of Yen Fu gives a most plausible analysis of this ele-
mental force. According to Yen Fu, two forces dominated Western society: (1) the
Promothean strain characterized by the exaltation of energy and power both over
nonhuman nature and within human society, and (2) social-political idealism repre-
sented by such terms as freedom, equality, democracy, and socialism.
The West has exalted human energy in all its manifestations - intel-
lectual, moral, and physical. It has identified spirit not with
passivity and withdrawal but with energy and assertion. The West
has discovered the unlimited nature of human capacities and has
fearlessly proceeded to actualize human potentialities undreamt-of
in traditional Chinese culture. The te~s which come to mind as
key-value terms are dynamism, purposive action, energy, assertiveness,
and realization of all potentialities (Schwartz, 1964:238).
The idea of progress, later buttr~ssed by the profit motive, social Darwinism, and
nationalism has provided the Promothean element in Western society. In Meiji Japan,
it was the force of nationalism which unlocked the energy to transform Japanese
society. In China the concept of class struggle has undermined the traditional
inertia, stability, and emphasis on harmony in Chinese civilization.
Class struggle. Struggle precedes and determines all progress in China. Class
struggle is the motivating force for social progress because only through class
Struggle is an affinnation of the "objective" dialectical process. "Struggle is
happiness." According to an article in the Workers Daily:
Chai~an Mao has also said: "There is boundless happiness to be found
in the struggles against earth and men." Only after one has lived
and struggled for the great ideal of communism can he feel that he
has lived a significant and happy life (Kan Feng, 1961:6-7).
While it is widely recognized that capitalism never really evolved in China, the
traditional aspiration to own land as the source of all wealth was a strong and con-
servative force in China. This tradition is criticized under the guise of class
struggle.
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struggle can the old and outmoded patterns of economic life be destroyed. As the
Chinese put it, through class struggle "we can smash the dilapidated and decaying
mechanisms and systems, and ... replace the old productive formula with a new formula"
(Liang Te-nan, 1960:6).6 Liu Shao-ch'i speaking on behalf of the central committee
in 1958 said that:
The peasants have the dual character of the toilers and the small pri-
vate owners. They are, on the one hand, willing to follow the socialist
road, but on the other hand they are conservative and narrow-minded and
are spontaneously inclined toward the deep-rooted traditions of capital-
ism....The ideological transformation of the peasants is also a pro-
tracted and arduous task (Kuan Ta-t'ung, 1962).
In building a socialist and communist society, we must not only thor-
oughly extinguish all old systems in which man exploits man and man
oppresses man, we must also exterminate all old ideas and habits which
stem from these systems and which serve these systems and linger in
the heads of men. We must destroy bourgeois ideology; we must establish
proletarian ideology. That is to say in the minds of people, we must
finally extinguish all the residues of exploiting classes and exploiting
systems. This task is much more·difficult than to destroy a class
e£onomica1l~, and it can only be resolved by a protracted and complex
LProgram oil education and struggle (quoted in Liang Te-nan, 1960:9).
The concept of class struggle is a flexible tool for attacking Chinese traditions.
The "bourgeois mentality" and "capitalism" are particularly elastic terms which can
be applied to a variety of social and economic practices which could hinder the
Communist elite's program of economic development. The "class viewpoint" is used to
draw a clear line of demarcation between proletariat (development oriented) thought
and bourgeois (tradition oriented) thought. Concretely this might mean that selfish
demands on the economic system (the desire for personal gain) would be classified as
"bourgeois" while selfless behavior (connnitment to connnunity needs) would be considered
"proletarian." To "establish proletarian thought against bourgeois thought" was the
chief means by which the Chinese leadership waged " a struggle against old customs and
habits" (Union Research Service, 1964:62).
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In the Chinese concept of struggle, conflict against oppressive classes is closely
linked to struggle against tradition and the forces of nature (Han Suyin, 1967:126).
Class conflict is the means by which contemporary China seeks to achieve economic devel-
opment and the Maoist utopian vision.
The Promethean quality of the idea of progress gives those who possess it a will,
perhaps even a compulsion, to overcome the social and economic obstacles to devel-
opment. If this Promothean element is present, the social.and economic obstacles
to development will be overcome. If the dominant elite at the local and national
level has a "will to modernize," they will take ~ steps necessary to remove obstacles
to development. If such a "will to modernize" is lacking, then no amount of technical
assistance cr foreign aid will remove the obstacles to development. In a sense, this
was recognized by a former Peace Corps volunteer writing about his experience.
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As in the case of Japan or China, the initial stimulus to development
may come from outside - in the shattering influence of a technolog-
ically more developed society. But the drive itself depends on a
local leadership disciplined enough to forgo its ~ pleasures in
order to promote advancemnt. This is the consideration that should
inform all programs of assistance, whether monetary, technical, or
human (The Rep~rter, 1966:61).
A similar conclusion was reached by Kusum Nair after traveling extensively in India.
She found distressingly little indication of grassroots involvement in economic
development. except in the Kaira area of the state of Gujerat. There,
The sharp business acumen, resourcefulness and energy of this Patidar
peasantry of Kaira is undeniable and the mean cause of its extra-
ordinary affluence and success. These qualities were further canalized
by the nationalist movement for independence which swept the country
in the first half of the century. This movement seems to have provided
the inspiration, the ~ norms and values, and the necessary purposeful
direction for the corporate effort which made this degree of rural
development possible (Kusum Nair, 1962:175-176)'.
Perhaps one of the most perceptive recognitions of the importance of a "will to
modernize" has been stated by a Brazilian who for years sought to answer why his
country's economic potential had yet ~o be realized. He writes:
No, it is not a question of roundly rejecting or denying the past in
order to transplant alien formulas, in the way that political regimes,
codes, and constitutions have been transplanted. It is now a·question
of re-examining the past and reinterpreting it in the light of the
values and knowledge of the present day, not only to replace those
ideal images that remain enthroned upon "Brazilian a1 tars long after
their proper time has past, but also to hasten the rectification of
the master outlines that have presided over the building of the nation
(Moog, 1964:181-182).
Apparently he means something more than agrarian reform, economic reform, financial
reform, and constitutional reform, for he writes:
Certainly Brazil is in need of reforms and achievements of every kind -
railways and highways, electric power, utilization of waterfalls,
immigration of the pioneer type, instead of the bandeirante - all this
is being proclaimed daily (Moog, 1964).
What remains to be proclaimed, according to this Brazilian:
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is reform within the mind and spirit. Let us not be deluded. Without
a refornl of the spirit, without a reaction against the past, without
a searching of the national conscience - a great collective self-exami-
nation that will make Brazilians realize within themselves, not only
intellectually but emotionally, a radical change of ideals and attitudes
toward life, their country, and the universe - despite all the prodi-
gious material possibilities that have been knocking at the door so
long, Brazil will continue to be what she is: a land that is making
progress, but that is not ennobling itself; a land without a message
for the world, a disorganized collectivity lacking in moral initiative
and public spirit, a disarticulated society permanently hoping for
more or less providential miracle-workers or bandeira leaders to come
and solve problems that only those communities that are spiritually,
morally and constructively integrated know how and are able to solve
(1964).
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The thought of Mao Tse-tung has placed primary emphasis on the reform of the
mind and the spirit. In May, 1958, Liu Shao-ch'i urged his colleagues to recall Mao's
wartime dictum that it is man, not material, that counts. Liu also said that:
Ideological and political work is always the soul and guide of every
kind of work ....Some people say that ideological and political
work can produce neither grain nor coal nor iron. This is like failing
to see the wood for the trees. One may ask: have we not produced more
grain, coal and iron by formulating and carrying out correct political
lines .•. and by raising the socialist consciousness of the workers
... and are we not going to produce more and more by so doing?
(1962:436-437).
This belief that man rather than technology is the key in war or development is the
heart of the development strategy of Mao Tse-tung. While the Maoists occasionally
over-estimate the utility of ideological mobilization, they have recognized what may
be the central element in economic development: the unlimited potentialities of man
once his consciousness has been transformed through political activism and social
mobilization.
Ideological mobilization in China, like Puritanism in the West, represents a
religious fanaticism which leads to an increase in economic productivity. Protes-
tantism sanctioned the supremacy of the individual by rejecting the mediation of a
social authority - the Catholic Church - between God and the individual. As Max
Weber wrote in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, "Man is dominated
by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of life" (1956:53).
According to this new creed, society and its welfare will be taken care of by auto-
matic forces, by an "invisible hand" that will coordinate self-centered pursuits with
the common good. This spirit or faith was for a time carried by a very strong reli-
gious movement which purposely set itself apart from the traditions of medieval
Christianity. Puritanism gave its religious sanction to material pursuits. Puritanism
idealized what had previously been regarded as a lapse from spirtual concerns. What had
been chided before as unworthy became a calling of God: to do business, to accumulate,
and to lose no time at it. This religiously conceived version of the spirit of capital-
ism, and not its selfish and materialistic basis, became the Promethean urge that could
drive men toward entrepreneurial endeavors in the face of great economic risk and sacri-
fice. The thought of Mao Tae-tung resembles, in function, the mentality of the Puritans.
His calling is not that of God but rather of class, the nation, and the charismatic
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leader. But a calling it is.
This essay has tried to suggest ~hat ideology - a term frequently defined in a
pejorative sense - can be useful in the early phases of economic development. Ide-
ology helps initiate the process of development by challenging the ideas and methods
of traditional society. It provides an alternative vision of the good society. Once
the stability of traditional society has been disrupted, ideology plays a complex
and somewhat contradictory role in continuing to disrupt various segments of the old
social structure while maintaining the legitimacy and viability of the emerging
social structure. Ideology provides the vision and will to mobilize the elite and
the populace so that the goals of economic development might be achieved.
Ideology may begin to retard economic development when its evolving latent
functions are no longer served by manifest doctrine. Economic development will
inevitably create conditions.unexplained by the manifest doctrines of the ideology.
When this occurs, the latent functions of ideology must adapt to the requirements of
the emerging industrial society if ideology is not to impede continued development.
For example, while the Puritan ethic of frugality and austerity was essential during
the early phases of development, if the American consumer still responded to this
ethic, the American economy would probably be plunged into a severe economic crisis.
Industrial society requires not frugality and self-sacrifice, but a willingness to
consume, an insatiable demand for both goods and services. Among the most serious
obstacles to the continued rational development of industrial societies is the
invidious influence of their respective ideologies of development.
As suggested at the outset of this article, many observers of contemporary China
believe that ideology has already become counter-productive. Perhaps they are correct,
but our understanding of the inter-relationship between economic growth and social
institutions is still so rudimentary that there is little ground for certitude at
this point in time. Industrialization and industrial society may be. compatible with
a far wider variety of social political processes than. we have ordinarily thought.
Moreover, it may be unwise to draw generalized conclusions from the temporary economic
setbacks of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. In the long-run we
may discover that even in their failures, they did much to prepare the Chinese people
for industrial.society. This may be especially true with respect to the ability of
these two movements to disrupt traditional Chinese society, instill a vision of
progress, and energize the Chinese and their leaders with a will to overcome the
various obstacles to economic development.
Footnotes
lLifton's statement is only partially correct. The Great Leap assumed that will
power and volunteerism could be substituted for technology but only in certain sectors,
such as agricultural production, the rural industrial sector, and in rural social
overhead investment projects (road and water conservation projects).
ZAs quoted by Lifton, 1968:106. Originally quoted by Schram, 1966:295, quoting
Hsueh-hsi Mao Tse-tung ti szu-hsiang fang-fa ho kung-tso fang-fa, Peking, 1958:73.
3I t is interesting that Mao is today frequently criticized for doing what was
widely recognized as necessary a half-century ago. For example, in 1901 Chester
Holcombe observed that if Confucius was reduced to "his proper level, as a wise man











and the leaders of modern days," the "entire Chinese literary aristocracy" would be
made bankrupt (The Real Chinese Question:84).
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4Tuvesonsuggests that Karl Marx is a successor Bnd intellectual descendant to
St. John the Divine and Lord Veru1um (l964:vi). For discussions of the Marxist
concept of progress, see Meyer, 1963:85-86; Lichtheim, 1961:59-60; Berdyaev, 1960:
99-100, 102-103.
5 Er i k Erikson in referring to the Kibbutz movement in Israel, remarked that this
"is one example of a modern ideological utopia which freed unknown energies in young
people." See his "The Problem of Ego Identity," 1959:161. The same type of obser-
vation was made by an Israeli writer about the earlier settlers on the Second Aliyah
(immigration wave). He exclaimed: "What a tremendous energy was released by this
Aliyah!" Cited by Aya1, 1966:231. On the futility of outside economic assistance
in the absence of such energy see Lampman, 1957:23-29 and Mark Twain's! Connecticut
Yankee in King Arthur's Court, especially chaps. 8-10, 22-26.
6For articles on the use of class struggle for the elimination of old customs and
habits, see Union Research Service, 1964.
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